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Economic sanctions appear to be gaining wider usage by
the United States. To date however, policymakers have often
imposed sanctions with little information as to their likely
impact on the target country. Do past successful sanctions
have an element of commonality so that policymakers can gain
guidance as to the situations in which sanctions are likely
to meet their stated goals? Using a recently compiled data-
base on past sanctions, it is demonstrated that no clear
pattern can be found differentiating successful from unsuc-
cessful sanctions. Because of the inability to be able to
predict whether a new sanction will be successful or
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has chosen, in recent years, to uti-
lize economic sanctions as a cure for many foreign policy
dilemmas. The recent sanctions imposed against Iran, Libya,
Nicaragua, and South Africa are clear examples of the United
States' willingness to impose sanctions to achieve the
target's compliance with various U.S. foreign policy goals.
Sanctions are not the only possible tools for implementing a
foreign policy goal. If a continuum were drawn with force
on the left and diplomacy on the right, sanctions would fit
between the two and be closer to diplomacy, since they
clearly are not a use of regular force, nor are they a dip-
lomatic endeavor. By using sanctions instead of force or
diplomacy, can the U.S. guarantee with a reasonable amount
of certainty that a goal will be accomplished? Are there
differences between a successful sanction and an unsuccess-
ful one? Can those differences be used to predict whether a
sanction episode will be successful? Additionally, are the
goals of sanction episodes in the national interest of the
United States? What is the national interest of the United
States? This thesis will address these guestions. The
empirical sections of the thesis will examine the use of
economic sanctions in order to determine whether their
impact on the target country can be accurately predicted.
Based on this analysis, implications for the use of sanc-
tions to further the U.S. national interest are drawn.
A. HYPOTHESIS
Based on historical experience, situations can be
identified—based on political, military, economic and geo-
graphic factors in which sanctions can be implemented suc-
cessfully. Vital United States 1 foreign policy goals can
therefore be achieved through the use of economic sanctions
in these situations. Furthermore, because the policy impact
of sanctions can be assessed prior to implementation, it is
possible to use sanctions consistently in the national
interest.
B. METHODOLOGY
Three computer-aided methods will be used to differenti-
ate the circumstances surrounding successful from unsuccess-
ful sanctions. In part, vagueness in the literature
concerning the manner in which sanctions are successful
makes formal model construction difficult. More precisely
the literature is unclear as to what set of conditions are
necessary and sufficient for sanctions to be successful.
The literature is even more unclear as to variables reflec-
tive of the attainment of successful sanctions. The first
step in the empirical assessment of sanctions therefore is
one of data reduction, i.e., out of the many variables
suggestive as reflective of successful sanctions, factor
8
analysis 1 is used to determine which are redundant. The
variables identified as potentially useful in examining
sanctions are then used as the basis of distinguishing suc-
cessful sanction cases from those that were unsuccessful.
More specifically, the variables identified as reflecting
the major dimensions of the data are utilized in a discrimi-
nant analysis 2 to determine if they reflect the necessary
and sufficient conditions for success in implementing sanc-
tions. In particular this analysis attempts to see if it is
possible to identify a limited set of conditions necessary
for the successful implementation of a sanction policy.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II examines the literature on the foundations of
the national interest. Various methods for gauging the
national interest will be identified with one method chosen
for later use in this analysis. Literature pertaining to
economic sanctions will be reviewed in the following
chapter. In brief, a reading of the sanctions literature
indicates a consensus among scholars that sanctions seldom
work. Various theories about the characteristics of sanc-
tions will be presented. Reasons for success and failure of
sanctions will be guantified and used in the next chapter.
Chapter IV will use the computer-aided methods dis-
cussed, to try to accurately predict a successful sanction.
The groupings will include all public sanctions imposed
since 1914, sanction episodes divided by goals of the
sender, pre- and post-World War II sanctions and finally,
U.S. and non-U. S. instituted sanctions. The results from
the empirical analysis will be evaluated in the next
chapter.
Chapter VI will put aside the empirical results and use
one of the methods discussed in Chapter II to evaluate
whether economic sanctions are in the national interest of
the U.S. The final chapter will compare the empirical
results with the national interest evaluation to decide if
the hypothesis can be accepted or rejected.
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II. THE NATIONAL INTEREST
The concept of the national interest is freely used by
politicians and scholars alike even though there is no clear
consensus as to its exact nature. 3 Politicians use the con-
cept to justify policy decisions and to influence public
opinion towards the acceptance of that policy. Scholars use
the concept to try to explain a state's behavior and then to
further predict the direction of that state's foreign
policy. In each instance the use of the term has proven to
be less than satisfactory in justifying decisions and
motives. It is an elusive concept to define and remains
ambiguous even after the most scholarly attempts at inter-
pretation. The definitions have proven not to have applica-
bility in all political situations. The problem, in part,
lies in the fact that "the national interest is rooted in
values." 4 Most scholars agree with Stephan Bailey when he
says that the public interest is the "central concept of a
civilized polity," 5 but what use the national interest
should have continues to be a matter for debate.
The national interest, although uncertain as a concept,
can be used as an instrument of political action and as an
analytic tool. James Rosenau argues that,
as an analytic tool, it is employed to describe, explain,
or evaluate the sources or the adequacy of a nation's
foreign policy. As an instrument of political action, it
11
serves as a means of justifying, denouncing, or proposing
policies. 6
There is a third use of the national interest and that is as
a predictor of the future direction a nation's foreign
policy might take. Each use implies that the national
interest is well-understood and that there is general agree-
ment as to exactly what the concept implies. As previously
stated, that is not the case. There are still problems
identifying whether the national interest reflects a
nation's ultimate goals or just the instrumental means
employed to achieve those ultimate goals. Another aspect of
the debate on the use of the national interest is whether it
reflects a realist or idealist approach to policymaking.
A. THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The aforementioned disagreement on the various interpre-
tations of the national interest has its roots in early
discussions of the public interest. Therefore, an under-
standing of the national interest must begin with an under-
standing of the public interest. Hans Morganthau was the
first to propose that the public interest is distinct from
the national interest in that it pertains to the domestic
policies pursued by policymakers rather than the interna-
tional ones reflected in the national interest. From the
beginning of organized polity there has existed the concept
which eventually evolved into the public interest. The
terms "will of the prince" and "dynastic interests" were the
12
early manifestations of the national interest. 7 Only as the
concept of "nation" emerged was the term adopted and used,
often interchangeably with the public interest. That the
subject was in need of further attention and some systematic
clarification was recognized by the American Political
Science Association, which in 1960 chose The Public Interest
as its topic for discussion. The yearbook of essays which
resulted from this distinction, published in 1962 as The
Public Interest edited by Carl Friedrich, was a collection
of 19 differing viewpoints on how best to define the term.
The essays can be grouped into three competing and equally
attractive theories for discussion. First is the idea that
the public interest can be framed in totally moral or ethi-
cal terms. Others, however, believe it should reflect the
aggregate of individual utility as expressed in purely
economic terms. The third group of authors believes that it
should be based entirely on normative date—norms in the
society that can be measured. This shows from the outset
that the term can be viewed from various approaches and
achieve differing results.
Another grouping of the theories on the public interest
can be found in Glendon Schubert's The Public Interest , pub-
lished in 1960. Schubert divides the competing theories
into the rationalist, idealist, and realist camps. 8 The
idea that the public interest can shift with time and must
be considered as changing with circumstances is explained as
13
well. The most perplexing conclusion of Schubert, however,
is that although the above models of rationalist, idealist
and realist describe the prevailing theories, none can be
used to describe actual behavior of states when carrying out
foreign policy. He concurs with the noted journalist Walter
Lippman that the United States once had a public philosophy
based on the Constitution but does not have one now.
Yet another approach to the public interest is that of
William Meyer in his book Public Good and Political Author-
ity . Meyer equates the public interest with the public
good. He believes that the public good is a set of social
beliefs which can bring about an agreement among different
groups of people. His test of the public good is one of
workability and the amount of satisfaction the public can
find in it. The social beliefs mentioned above are a result
of people's experiences and can change. Therefore the
public good is of a relative, not absolute, nature.
This sample of theories regarding the definition of the
public interest shows that there is disagreement on method
and the framework for analysis, even on results.
B. AMERICAN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LITERATURE
The American concept of the public interest was heavily
influenced by America's unique political and social history.
It must be remembered that social and political analysis re-
flect the methods available to researchers during their time
period.
14
The evolution of America from a primarily agrarian
society to an industrial one was described by Vernon
Parrington in Main Currents in American Thought: Vol. II.
1800-1860
. He proposed that this transformation, along with
the rise of capitalism and the influence of French romantic
theories, combined to produce social thought that became
uniquely American. This singular American vision of the
universe was not either materialistic or idealistic, as
thought by Europeans, but was a vision in which the universe
could be both materialistic and idealistic. Thus the con-
cept of pluralism now crept its way into American social
thought. Pluralism had earlier entered the political realm
when James Madison explained it using the theory of interest
groups in the tenth of the Federalist Papers .
A major element in the transformation of European
thought into American attitudes was the influence of "the
frontier philosophy," as described by Henry Smith in Virgin
Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth . He paints a
picture of the stark reality of the bleak, open prairie
which greeted the pioneers and compares that to the pur-
ported myth of a vast golden and generous land available to
the settlers. The frontier frame of mind and the develop-
ment of a type of plebian democracy contributed substantial-
ly to what was to become the American's image of their
national identity. This frontier mentality was checked by
Richard Reeves in his American Journey , and updated to see
15
if the mentality still existed in the 1980' s. He traced the
steps of Alexis de Tocqueville ' s 1830 journey and found
enough changes to postulate that the original Puritan
republic had been replaced by a selfish democracy.
American social thought went through another stage of
development during the years leading up to and including the
First World War. Barbara Tuchman9 postulates that it was
not really "the good old days," but was actually a time of
anarchists not unlike today's terrorists, looking for a vio-
lent spark to promote their point of view. In Europe,
trans-nationalism was replaced by the nationalism which
served as the driving force in many political matters and
eventually plunged the continent into war. During the same
time period there was a cultural revolution occurring in the
United States, according to Henry F. May. 10 Feelings of
patriotism, optimism and assurance were being replaced with
a disenchantment and disillusionment, due to the failure of
World War I to fulfill the idealistic and romantic hopes of
the populace. The stark reality of the horrifying slaughter
in the trenches was the final blow that shattered America's
practical idealism and transformed its attitudes and values
to a more cynical view of the world.
The end of World War I, combined with the Great Depres-
sion, another world war, and the development of the atomic
bomb all contributed to yet another reorientation of
American values. The liberal tradition penetrated American
16
social and political thought from that time possibly up
until the election of Ronald Reagan. With the advent of
such concepts as "interdependence" and other concepts
connoting the shape of the new world order, the public
interest has become synonymous with the national interest.
The use of scarce resources to fill the needs of the public
interest also impacts on the national interest.
C. APPROACHES TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST
There are myriad approaches to the complex subject of
the national interest. It is easily defined in simplistic
terms such as "the President thinks it should be that way"
or in a more complex but hardly operational form such as "it
is an expression of the national identity of the nation
involved." A different approach is to say that the national
interest should really be an international interest, since
nation-states are predicted to disappear in the future. The
majority of the theories on the definition of the national
interest fall into three categories: the logical-deduc-
tive, operationalist, or the empirical-inductive approach. 11
There are, of course, a few writings that will not fall
within these categories. Robert Johansen cannot be
accurately classified as one of the mentioned approaches but
does contribute to the knowledge level of the subject.
Johansen believes that the national interest should be
approached from a global humanist framework. For him, the
four basic interests are termed world order values
17
comprising "peace without national military arsenals,
economic well-being for all inhabitants on the earth, uni-
versal human rights and social justice, and ecological
balance." 12 Friedrich Kratochwil, another exception
proposes that the national interest can be learned from
studying the related concept of the public interest. His
contribution to the study of the national interest is that
he believes it is situational.
1. Logical-Deductive Approach
The logical-deductive approach has been described by
Stephan Krasner as assuming "that states will pursue certain
objectives—in particular, preserving territorial and
political integrity." 13 This formulation of the national
interest is very similar to James Rosenau's description of
"objectivists. " He states that,
. . . the best interests of a nation is a matter of objec-
tive reality and that by describing this reality one is
able to use the concept of the national interest as a
basis for evaluating the appropriateness of the policies
which a nation pursues. 14
The objective reality in the form of objectives is most
often thought of in terms of power. Hans Morganthau could
easily be labeled as a follower of this approach to the
national interest. His view of the objectives that a state
would pursue are based on an objective assessment of the
power of that nation. There are problems with this
approach, not the least of which is that objectivity is
always relative. The second problem is that the assessment
18
of power is also a subjective determination, since power is
an influence process and probably is understood as well as
the national interest is in the literature. The final prob-
lem with this approach is that it may well answer policy
questions related to core objectives of states but there is
no way to use this approach to explain the peripheral objec-
tives of nations.
2 . The Operationalists ' Approach
The crux of this approach is the focus on formulat-
ing an operational definition of the national interest.
This is necessarily the most complex approach to the problem
of the national interest. To adopt this approach an analyst
must include items of the situational nature of the concept
as well as the national identity of the nation, both diffi-
cult to formulate. One such attempt to operationalize the
national interest can be found in an article entitled "The
Quest for an Operational Definition of the National
interest." The author has attempted to identify three
component parts of the national interest. 15
a. The Historical-Cultural Foundation
This is a body of experience and political-legal
structure which articulates a particular conception of
reality. A "sociology of knowledge model" is constructed
which shows a hierarchal linkage between individual thought,
social thought, and action. Metaphysical concepts structure
attitudes, and these attitudes in turn influence the frame
19
of reference of political perceptions. There are three
systems which could develop to answer the question of the
nature of man: materialistic, idealistic, and the
pluralistic.
b. The Problematic or Situational Context
This is the real world demands that both initi-
ate the decision-making process and provide the context in
which that process takes place. This is similar to Krato-
chwil's comment on the situational nature of the concept.
c. The Hierarchy of Perceived or Actual Needs
This develops from the interaction of the first
two components and produces a process which varies with the
political system in question. The American system,
abounding in pluralism, can only interact in a context of
compromise and consensus.
The author agrees that the national interest is
difficult to operationalize, especially in the context of
the pluralistic system employed by the United States. The
problem is that "at the present time there is no formal
machinery for synthesizing diverse political knowledge into
a national consensus." 16 Herein lies the root of the
problem—finding the necessary machinery to channel the
diverse opinions into an organized national effort. This
approach is intellectually the most sophisticated but the






The final approach deals with what Stephan Krasner
articulates as the "national interest is induced from the
statements and behavior of central decisionmakers." 17 He
puts a qualifier on the above definition that "the actions
of leaders must be related to general objectives, not to the
preferences or needs of any particular group or class ..."
and that "the ordering of preferences must persist over
time." 18 This approach is similar to that of the subjectiv-
ists outlined by James Rosenau. The subjectivists believe
that the national interest is not objective but is "a
pluralistic set of subjective preferences that change when-
ever the requirements and aspirations of the nation's
members change." 19 Both of these frameworks reject the
objective outline of the national interest and propose that
decisionmakers' actions and policies can be analyzed to
determine the national interest.
Donald Nuechterlein could be described as using the
empirical-inductive approach to the national interest. He
outlines the basic national interests of each state into
four distinct groups: 20
1. Defense interests : the protection of the nation-state
and its citizens against the threat of physical vio-
lence directed from another state or against an
externally inspired threat to its system of
government.
2. Economic interests : the enhancement of the nation-
state's economic well-being in relations with other
states.
21
3. World order interests ; the maintenance of an inter-
national political and economic system in which the
nation-state may feel secure and in which its citizens
and commerce may operate peacefully outside its
borders.
4. Ideological interests : the protection and furtherance
of a set of values that the citizens of a nation-state
share and believe to be universally good.
The basic national interests must be put into a hierar-
chal structure depending on the situation in question. To
establish a system of ranking, Nuechterlein develops what he
terms "intensities of interest." These are, in descending
order of intensity: 21
1. Survival issues : when the very existence of a nation-
state is in jeopardy, as a result of overt military
attack on its own territory, or from the threat of
attack if an enemy's demands are rejected.
2. Vital issues : when serious harm will very likely
result to the state unless strong measures, including
the use of conventional military forces, are employed
to counter an adverse action by another state or to
deter it from undertaking a serious provocation.
3. Major issues : when a state's political, economic, and
ideological well-being may be adversely affected by
events and trends in the international environment and
thus requires corrective action in order to prevent
them from becoming serious threats (vital issues)
.
4. Peripheral issues : when a state's well-being is not
adversely affected by events or trends abroad, but
when the interests of private citizens and companies
operating in other countries might be endangered.
To operationalize the concepts presented above Nuechter-
lein has devised a matrix to evaluate each policy issue
under question. The subjective nature of his approach comes
to the forefront when the analyst is required to determine
whether the basic national interest in question is of a
22
survival, vital, major, or peripheral intensity. The basic
formulation of the matrix would look like this: 22
Country: Issue:
Basic interest at stake Intensity of interest
Survival Vital Major Peripheral




The fatal flaw in this approach goes back to the
assertion by Rosenau that the national interest is rooted in
values. The values which are unconsciously held prejudice
the analyst in his ranking of the intensities of interest.
Since the nature of this research effort is empirical, the
choice of which approach to follow is limited to the
empirical-inductive approach. A matrix similar to the one
presented above will be formulated to assess the question of
whether economic sanctions are in the national interest.
There still remains the problem of defining the concept of
the national interest to be used in this research effort.
D. DEFINITION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST
A very simplified definition could be that the national
interest is whatever Congress says it is when they approve
the country's budget each fiscal year. There is some ele-
ment of the truth in that statement. Whatever programs that
23
are funded must be in the best interests of the nation,
therefore they must be in the national interest. Unfortu-
nately that proposition must be rejected. Another simpli-
fied definition could be that the President articulates what
the national interest is each year when he delivers his
State of the Union address. Again the elements of the
preceding discussion seem to be missing from that defini-
tion. Those elements summarized include:
- There is a situational element in the national interest
- Cultural context plays an important part in the develop-
ment of the national identity which is in turn reflected
in the national interest
- The concept of pluralism must be included when defining
the national interest
- Each issue must be able to be prioritized by
policymakers
- Values play an important role in the national interest
- The policies selected must be shown to be consistent
over time
- There must be an element of legitimacy in the determina-
tion of policies.
Putting all of those characteristics together is a
complex task which has not yet been successfully completed
by politician or scholar alike. For the purposes of this
research effort a combination of Nuechterlein and Krasner
will be utilized. "The national interest is the perceived
needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to the
sovereign states comprising its external environment." 23
The needs and desires will be "induced from the statements
24
and behavior of central decisionmakers." 24 The evaluation
will actually center more on the results of that behavior,
namely the cases where sanctions have been publicly imposed.
E. SUMMARY
The initial portion of the discussion of the national
interest centered on the problems associated with defining
the concept. The national interest is rooted in values
which tends to bias any approach to the problem. It has
been used as an analytic tool and as an instrument of
political action. The results of the search have shown that
the definitions have been ambiguous and elusive. The
national interest has evolved from simply the will of the
prince to a concept of the public interest. The public
interest theories were surveyed and the same problems of
ambiguity were seen. The public interest was further shown
to apply to only those policies that were domestically
related, at least since the time of Hans Morgantheau. The
influence of social and political writings was shown.
There were three approaches to defining the national
interest in the present day. They were the logical-
deductive, operationalist, and empirical-inductive
approaches. The present day national interest was shown to
also include the public interest because the resources
required for the national interest would impinge on the
domestic front. The empirical-inductive approach was chosen
in keeping with the general slant of this research effort.
25
There are problems with each of the approaches but Nuechter-
lein's matrix was picked for ease of operation in presenting
the economic sanctions as a whole.
26
III. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
The term sanction, in its generally accepted form, means
the use of some type of measure to regulate human behavior
towards a socially acceptable standard. Economic sanctions
in that sense are no different from societal sanctions.
They attempt to regulate behavior on a much grander scale,
that of nation-states. The behavior modification expected
by sanctions is performed by the use of coercion. If a
state follows the rules of law according to a consensus of
states, then it may escape international behavior modifica-
tion techniques. There has been debate in the literature
over the exact definition of sanctions. Some authors prefer
the following strictly legal definition:
sanctions in the context of a legal system are negative
measures which seek to influence conduct by threatening
and, if necessary, imposing penalties for non-conformity
with law. 25
Others define sanctions as:
. . . actions initiated by one or more international
actors (the 'senders') against one or more others (the
'receivers') with either or both of two purposes: to
punish the receivers by depriving them of some value
and/or to make the receivers comply with certain norms the
senders deem important. 26
The most common and simplified definition is "economic sanc-
tions are economic measures directed to political objec-
tives." 27 Implicit in all the definitions is the assumption
27
that economic measures can have a political effect. For the
purposes of this paper the last definition will be used.
Sanctions must be differentiated from the concept of
economic warfare. Economic warfare usually includes mili-
tary measures and is used during a time of war or other
instances of overt violence. Economic sanctions can be used
both during war and peace. Sanctions also differ from
economic warfare in that sanctions usually do not have total
victory as the goal. Economic warfare is aimed at the
facilities for producing wartime goods and machinery, while
sanctions are usually aimed at some peacetime capability.
There are exceptions, such as the strategic embargo used by
the West toward the Communist countries which is aimed at
war-type materials yet is conducted in a period where overt
conflict is absent. A strategic embargo is one type of
sanction, yet there are many other forms a sanction may
take.
A. TYPES OF SANCTIONS
Sanctions may, according to Johan Galtung, 28 , be of a
diplomatic, communication, or economic nature. Diplomatic
sanctions consist of such items as non-recognition and rup-
ture of diplomatic relations, to name a few. Communication
sanctions can consist of loss of mail contact or loss of
general telecommunications or transportation. Loss of news
communications can also be a form of a communication
sanction.
28
Economic sanctions can be classified according to the
number of states that initiate the action. There can be one
government responsible, termed unilateral, or there can be
an alliance of states responsible, labeled multilateral. In
addition, there can be an international organization respon-
sible for initiating the sanctions, named universal. The
focus of the sanction can aid in classifying the sanction.
Will all goods be restricted from export to the country
targeted or will it be a selective restriction? Addition-
ally, whether the target states 1 imports or exports will be
sanctioned opens another method for classification. The
final method for classification is based on the type of
policies which accompany the sanctions. For example, a
country initiating a sanction may also break diplomatic
relations with the target or it may institute a covert plan
for the overthrow of the target regime while the sanctions
are being implemented. This study will not focus on any one
of the types mentioned but rather will approach the problem
using all the forms listed above for the analysis. The main
thrust of the analysis will be focused on the curtailing of
exports, the limitation of imports, and the slowing down of
financial flows to the target country. This may seem a
simple task at first look yet there continues to be dis-
agreement among the experts on many facets of sanction
theory.
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B. CONSENSUS AND DISAGREEMENT
The point of agreement of most scholars on the nature of
economic sanctions is that they are ineffectual towards
achieving a satisfactory result. For example,
Mastanduno: "If a consensus exists in the literature on
international economic sanctions, it is that
attempts to use economic instruments to
achieve political objectives are likely to
fail." 29
Olson: "It is worth noting at the outset that there
is a consensus in this literature that
economic sanctions are largely ineffective." 30
Lindsay: "Most observers conclude that trade sanctions
are not successful policy instruments." 31
Wallensteen: "The general picture is that economic sanc-
tions have been unsuccessful as a means of
influence in the international system" 32
There have been dissenting viewpoints but they have been
relatively few. One such dissenter is Judith Miller, who
reports on the American boycott of Ugandan coffee saying
. . . there is considerable evidence that while the coffee
boycott failed, the American sanctions proved devastating
to the Ugandan economy. ... In that respect, the U.S.
boycott can appropriately be called a success. 33
Another dissenting view is presented by Hufbauer and Schott
in the statement "Perhaps surprisingly, sanctions have been
'successful'—by our definition— in 36 percent of the cases
overall." 34 The term successful brings to light the first
of many points where the literature has a difficult time of
agreement.
There are many factors or variables on which the experts
disagree, which make up a sanction episode. The first is on
30
the definition of a successful sanction. The second is on
the role of goals or objectives in sanctions. Disagreement
exists on definitions of the types of objectives in addition
to their role. The third item is the role of publicity in a
sanction episode. The final area of disagreement is the
role of military force in a sanction episode. Each of these
disagreements will be addressed separately in a later
section of this chapter when the current theory of sanctions
is dealt with.
C. A SHORT HISTORY OF SANCTIONS
Sanctions are far from a twentieth century invention.
According to Hufbauer and Schott, sanctions have been used
as far back as ancient Greece. 35 The early American
colonies used a boycott in response to the Stamp Act imposed
by the British. Margaret Doxey concurs by saying "The use
of economic weapons to achieve political ends is, of course,
not a new phenomenon." 36 Suffice it to say that they were
not invented in this century but have been in existence for
centuries. Perhaps the amount of interest in sanctions as a
policy tool is a direct result of the proposition that they
have been used more often in this century than in previous
eras. In this century, the starting point for the use of
economic sanctions lay with the formation of the League of
Nations. According to Donald Lossman, Article 16 of the
League Covenant provided for international sanctions against
an aggressor.
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The essence of the article was that in certain circum-
stances the members of the League of Nations were to cease
all economic intercourse with a country committing
aggression. 37
This was the first universal, international attempt to regu-
late behavior. An analogy can be extended to the present
day United Nations, which has the similar possibility,
through international authority, to regulate behavior. A
serious problem evolves when the capability for enforcement
of sanctions is compared with the authority to impose sanc-
tions. The case of the United Nations imposing sanctions on
Rhodesia is an up-to-date example.
One problem that is revealed in the history of sanctions
is the role of force in their implementation. The problem
has been stated succinctly by James Barber.
Indeed, the relationship between sanctions and the use of
force is fraught with ambiguity. Whilst some advocates of
sanctions see them as an alternative to force, there is a
contrary view that sanctions can only be effective when
force is available and ready to be used if required. 38
The heart of this debate is the credibility behind the
imposition of the sanctions. If the sender state has the
capability, in the form of armed forces, to backup the
sanction threat and the will to use that force will that
affect the possibility of success? This question is
extremely pertinent to the imposition of sanctions today and
to the question of the utility of using force for political
objectives.
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D. APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
There are two different classification schemes for
defining the various approaches used in describing economic
sanctions theory. Richard Ellings provides the first scheme
by dividing past approaches into the policy analysis,
theoretical-deductive, and comparative-inductive categor-
ies. 39 Peter Wallensteen provides the alternative scheme
when he divides the approaches into sender-oriented, receiv-
er-oriented, Sender/Receiver (SR) -relation-oriented, and
environment-oriented theories. 40 Elling's approaches are:
1. Policy analysis approach . This is the most common
approach applied to one in particular, but sometimes
to more than one case. Ellings uses Anna Schrieber's
study of the U.S. imposed sanctions against Cuba and
the Dominican Republic as an example of this type of
approach. Another example used is Gunnar Adler-
Karlsson's major work entitled Western Economic
Warfare 1947-1967.
2. Theoretical-deductive approach . This approach speaks
in terms of generalizations gleaned from examples
included in the study. Johan Galtung's study on the
UN sanctions imposed on Rhodesia provide an example of
this approach. Yuan-Li Wu is also representative of
this type of approach. He provides some general
guidelines deduced from the various case studies
investigated and reported in his book Economic War-
fare , published in 1952.
3. Comparative-inductive approach . This approach exam-
ines a set of cases in a systematic manner. Margaret
Doxey and Peter Wallensteen both belong in this group-
ing. Wallensteen uses a baseline of 10 cases in which
he mentions variables which influence the cases.
Doxey takes a more legalistic approach when looking at
multilateral international sanctions.
Ellings himself falls slightly into the deductive
approach, by his own admission, yet he offers another
approach not belonging to the past approaches. His approach
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is labeled the "diachronic approach, meaning that it strives
to understand processes of change over time; processes at
the level of the international system are emphasized.
"
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Stated differently, he attempts to show that systemic
factors are the context in which sanctions should be
evaluated and understood.
Wallensteen, a member of Elling's inductive school,
takes a different tack when he describes the theories about
economic sanctions.
1. Sender-oriented theories . They include structural and
behavioral aspects of the sender, such as rank and
motive. A typical theory is one stressing the
sender's 'minuscule interest' in bringing the sanc-
tions to a successful end, or pointing to the sender's
'low capacity' to enforce something.
2. Receiver-oriented theories . These cover the structur-
al and behavioral aspects of the receiver, such as the
effects of the sender's measures adopted. An example
would be a theory focusing on the economic vulnerabil-
ity of the receiver or pointing out the unanimous sup-
port within the receiver of the pursued policy.
3. SR-relation-oriented theories . These theories focus
on comparative relations as well as interaction, the
actors' perception of each other. An example would be
any theory on the historical relations between the
sender and receiver and their rank relation.
4. Environment-oriented theories . These are theories
which refer to the reaction of the international sys-
tem outside the sender and receiver and the time of
occurrence. An example would be a theory stressing
the importance of 'sanction breakers.' 42
Wallensteen would probably place Ellings into the cate-
gory of environment-oriented approaches. As can be seen
from the diversity of approaches there should be no surprise
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that there are differences of opinions on important factors
related to sanctions theory.
E. CURRENT THEORY
Economic sanctions are based on the theory that coercion
in the economic realm can force compliance in the political
realm. This has, in itself, been a debated premise as is
the problem of how to accurately determine if a sanction
episode has been successful in forcing compliance. The
initial problem seems to be that it is extremely difficult
to determine if behavior was changed because of the sanction
or would the behavior have changed even if the sanctions
were not instituted. Therefore the starting point in any
discussion of sanction theory must begin with the defini-
tion of success.
1. Success
Margaret Doxey defines an effective sanction as
".
. . one which succeeds in producing the desired behavior-
al response from the individual or group to which it is com-
municated." 43 This really does not answer the question
posed by Richard Olson and others about the problems asso-
ciated with compliance. Olson points out that " . . . it is
often unclear just what is being attacked by the sanctions,
aside from the simplistic answer that it is 'the econo-
my'." 44 Hufbauer and Schott provide an alternative defini-
tion of success by saying that "The 'success' of an economic
episode—as viewed from the perspective of the sender
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country—has two parts: the extent to which the policy
outcome sought by the sender country was in fact achieved,
and the contribution made by sanctions to a positive
outcome." 45 The policy outcome is gleaned from the public
statements of objectives made by policymakers. It is clear
that the policy outcome publicly pronounced by policy-makers
may not be the actual goals sought in the campaign or those
goals may change over time.
2 . Goals and Objectives
There is a multitude of ways of categorizing the
goals sought by sender countries in each sanction episode.
Some examples from the literature are:
Doxey: ideological, political and economic46
Lindsay: compliance, subversion, deterrence, interna-
tional symbolism, or domestic symbolism47
Weintraub: formal, undisclosed and implicit48
Barber: primary, secondary and tertiary49
There is overlap in the types of objectives sought by sender
states in the listing above. Each author has reached a dif-
ferent conclusion on the effects of the types of objectives.
It appears that the consensus in the literature is that
objectives do change over time and that adds to the diffi-
culty in assessing their viability. Hufbauer and Schott
categorize the various objectives used in past sanction
episodes into the following groups:
- change target country policies in a relatively modest
way (modest in the scale of national goals, but often of
burning importance to participants in the episode)
,
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illustrated by the human rights and nuclear nonprolifer-
ation cases.
- destabilize the target government (including, as an
ancillary goal, change the target country policies),
illustrated by the US campaign against Castro, and the
Soviet campaign against Tito.
- disrupt a minor military adventure, illustrated by the
UK sanctions against Argentina over the Falkland
Islands.
- impair the military potential of the target country,
illustrated by World Wars I and II and the COCOM sanc-
tions against the USSR and its allies.
- change the target country policies in a major way
(including the surrender of territory) , illustrated by
the UN campaign against South Africa over apartheid and
control of Namibia. 50
Each of these goals consists of highly public attempts at
coercion. The inherent argument in the Weintraub thesis is
that these only constitute the formal objectives but not the
other less public goals.
3 . Overt or Covert Measures
The basis of the arguments presented in the
literature is that public attempts of coercion fail mainly
because they are public and the target state has no way to
save face in the international community if it succumbs to
the pressure. Weintraub may be correct in his estimate that
less public attempts at persuasion are more easily accom-
plished. Publicity is what separates a sanction from an
under-the-table deal. A sanction "cannot be arbitrary or ad
hoc : its existence must be generally known, and it must be
regular in its incidence." 51 Publicity serves a useful
function in that it sometimes satisfies a domestic
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requirement for action. The current debate in the U.S. on
apartheid in South Africa may be an excellent example of the
domestic need for action. The domestic sector is in the
process of divesture from investments in South Africa and
the Congress may be expected to follow suit with a
sanction's policy.
Covert measures can be used instead of overt measures,
or in concert with the more public attempts at coercion.
The cases included in this analysis include a variable which
indicates which policy option was selected by the sender
state. Since this study is mainly concerned with the U.S.
national interest, and given the nature of publicity in a
democratic state, public attempts of economic coercion will
probably be the norm in the present as well as in the
future. Therefore the public cases listed in Appendix A
will be the basis for the empirical analysis in the next
chapter.
4 . Positive Versus Negative Methods
There is also a debate in the literature over the
carrot and the stick approaches to sanctions. Baldwin
defines the carrot approach or positive sanction as ". . .
actual or promised rewards to B;" and he defines the stick
or negative sanctions as "actual or threatened punishments
to B." 52 Many who do not see the utility of negative sanc-
tions offer the positive approach as the policy alternative
of the future. James O'Leary, David Baldwin and Peter
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Wallensteen all trumpet the merits of positive inducements
over negative threats. The cost of a positive reward could
potentially outweigh the cost involved with a threat. For
the positive approach to work the reward must be awarded
when the target complies with the sender's desires. On the
other hand, a threat is only credible if it doesn't have to
be instituted. Positive inducements may have a strengthen-
ing effect on the target economy, which is not a bad side
effect if the target is an ally of the sender or a neutral
country. What happens if the target is a country diametri-
cally opposed to the survival of the sender country? There
is some doubt that the sender would want to bolster the
economy of an enemy state just for compliance with an inter-
national norm which most other states agree the target has
violated. Since most, if not all, past sanctions have been
in the form of punishments the negative approach will be
followed in this study.
5 . Reasons for Failure
Each of the factors listed above can constitute a
reason for failure. Compliance is too difficult to obtain,
therefore success is elusive. Objectives shift over time
and the policymaker does not have a clear idea of what the
actual objectives are that he is pursuing. Another reason
is that the sanctions were made public and the target state,
in order to not lose face, stiffened and there resulted a
rallying around the flag. The threat of punishment rather
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than an offer of a reward for compliance is also considered
a reason for failure. Johan Galtung postulates that the
critical variable in the success of a sanction is the vul-
nerability of the target. On the other hand James Lindsay-
proposes that sanctions fail because of the effect that
publicity has on the goals of compliance and subversion,
while having a positive effect on the goals of international
and domestic symbolism. Richard Ellings believes that the
failures are due to the change in the structural trends of
the global system of power, and predictions on the effec-
tiveness of sanctions have to be handled on a case-by-case
basis. Doxey concentrates on the problem of international
enforcement as the main cause of failure. Hufbauer and
Schott list a number of limitations of sanctions: the means
used may not be adequate for the task, the sanctions them-
selves may create their own antidote, allies of the target
country support their cause, or there may be a backlash
abroad and at home to the institution of sanctions. Each of
the above reasons may be intuitively seen to be the causes
for failure. An approach is required which can empirically
test the suggested reasons for failure and determine statis-
tically which variables have the largest impact on the suc-
cess of sanctions.
This study will attempt to quantify the economic and
political variables suggested in the literature to deter-
mine, using a statistical method, whether successful
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sanctions can be predicted based on past users of coercion.
Additionally, the variables will be statistically ranked to
show which of the variables do indeed account for the most
probable reason for success. This approach was used
sparingly by Hufbauer and Schott in their analysis. Their
statistical analysis produced a resultant 20 percent of the
statistical variation in the success of sanctions.
F. SUMMARY
The various definitions of sanctions were previewed
noting a tendency toward the negative type of sanction. The
definition of sanctions has an inherent problem and that is
reaching agreement on exactly what compliance entails. The
next topic discussed was the classification of sanctions
according to type.
It has been shown that sanctions can be unilateral,
multilateral, or universal. They can be classified accord-
ing to the amount of restrictions placed on the target,
i.e., partial or complete restrictions. Another method of
typology is whether the sanctions are aimed at the target's
imports or exports of the sender. The final method men-
tioned was whether there were accompanying policies in the
form of covert operations. Despite the various methods of
classification it appears that there is a consensus in the
literature that sanctions are ineffectual. Points of dis-
agreement were also mentioned: success, goals and
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objectives, publicity, positive versus negative measures and
reasons for failure.
To establish the context within which sanctions work
today, a short history was presented in which the only con-
clusion reached is that sanctions are not a twentieth
century invention. They may have been used more frequently
in this century than in the previous ones.
Methods of evaluating sanctions were discussed. Two
frameworks were discussed. Richard Ellings groups the past
approaches into the policy analysis, theoretical-deductive,
and the comparative-inductive categories. His approach is
labelled the diachronic approach. Peter Wallensteen labels
the various approaches as the sender-oriented theories,
receiver-oriented theories, SR-relation-oriented theories
and the environment-oriented theories. The approach
selected for this study will be an empirical approach based
on a statistical method.
The areas in current theory where there is debate were
mentioned. The definition of success was discussed with the
resultant acceptance of the definition provided by Hufbauer
and Schott. The myriad of methods to describe the perceived
objectives of the country initiating the sanctions were
shown again with the acceptance of the objectives outlined
by Hufbauer and Schott. Overt and covert methods of coer-
cion were shown to be distinctive forms of influence. Sanc-
tions were seen to include publicity which is an inherent
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characteristic of coercion and necessary to qualify under
the heading as a sanction. Positive versus negative instru-
ments were discussed culminating in the proposition that
most sanctions have been of the negative persuasion.
Finally the abundance of reasons for the failure of
sanctions were presented. This study will test the intui-
tive reasons for failure in a statistical method and rank




Hufbauer and Schott's Economic Sanctions Reconsidered:
History and Current Policy , which contains the most thorough
set of data compatible with the slant of this research
effort, is used as the starting point for the necessary
variables utilized in the analysis. The authors also
provided a means by which to evaluate the success of an
economic sanction. Their "success score" is a numerical
score from 1 to 16, with 16 denoting a completely successful
sanction episode and a score of 1 denoting a completely
failed attempt at coercion. To achieve that score each
sanction episode was rated by both a policy result and a
measure of the sanction contribution to that policy result.
The policy result is described as "the extent to which the
outcome sought by the sender country was achieved" 53 and is
assigned a numerical score as follows:
1 failed outcome
2 unclear but possibly positive
3 positive outcome
4 successful outcome
The sanctions contribution is a score which "indicates the
extent to which the sanctions contributed to a positive
policy result." 54 Sanctions contribution, like the policy
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result, were assigned numerical scores to indicate
effectiveness
:




The success score is then calculated by multiplying the
policy result index by the sanctions contribution score,
producing an overall success score of between 1 (total
failure) and 16 (total success) . For the purposes of this
evaluation, success scores of 9 or above were deemed to
represent a successful sanction episode. Therefore, to have
a successful sanction, the policy result index must repre-
sent at least a positive outcome (numerical score of 3) and
the sanctions contribution score must represent at least a
modest contribution (numerical score of 3) for the lowest
scored successful sanction. The highest scored successful
sanction would represent a policy result of a successful
outcome (numerical score of 4) and the sanctions contribu-
tion score would be a significant contribution to the policy
result (numerical score of 4) . The cases in which the
overall success scores were 9 or above were placed into the
category of a "good sanction," abbreviated in the analysis
as GSANC and assigned a numerical score of 1. The cases
where the overall success scores were 8 or below were also
placed into the GSANC category and assigned a numerical
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score of 0, to aid in the discrimination between the
categories.
A. VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSIS
The thirty-four variables used in the analysis can be
grouped into four different categories: economic, politi-
cal, geographic and military. The economic variables are
listed below: 55
1. Cost to Target (COSTG)
2. Cost as a Percentage of GNP (COGNP)
3. Cost per Capita (COCAP)
4. Trade Linkage (TRADE)
5. GNP Ratio: Sender to Target (GNPRA)
6. Type of Sanctions (TYPE)
7. Cost to Sender (COSEN)
8. Sender's GNP (SGNP)
9. Target's GNP (TGNP)
10. Sender Industry (SINDUS)
11. Target Industry (TINDUS)
12. Target Concentration of Exports (TCIX)
13. Target Commodity Concentration (COMCON)
14. Target Import Concentration (IMCOM)
15. Target Merchandise Export Index (MEREX)
Economic variables 1 through 9 were given in Hufbauer and
Schott's Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and
Current Policy . 56 Variables 10 through 15 were gleaned from
World Bank data published in 1985. 57
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The next list of variables reflects political influences
on the conduct of sanctions:
1. Companion Policies (COMPA)
2. International Cooperation with Sender (INTCO)
3. International Assistance to Target (INTAS)
4. Sanctions Period (PERIO)
5. Health and Stability Index (HEALT)
6. Prior Relations Index (PRIOR)
7. Target Government (TGOVT)
Variables 1 through 6 were taken from Hufbauer and Schott's
study. 58 Target government was an intuitive measure of
whether the target government was/ is democratic or non-
democratic. There is not a provision in the target govern-
ment variable for the personality of the leaders involved.
The third category of variables are the geographic
variables:
1. Sender Population (SPOP)
2. Target Population (TPOP)
3. Target Area (TAREA)
4. Sender Area (SAREA)
5. Target Urbanization (URBAN)
6. Target Higher Education Index (HEDUC)
7. Target Region (TREGN)
8. Sender Region (SREGN)
Variables 1 and 2 were gleaned from the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency's "World Military Expenditures and Arms
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Transfers." 59 Variables 3 through 6 were gathered from
World Bank data published in 1985. 60 Target and sender
regions were determined using a numerical indicator for the
regions as follows: 1—North America, 2—Latin America, 3
—
Africa, 4—Asia, 5—Europe, 6—Communist Eastern Europe, 7
Middle East and 8—South Pacific.
The final grouping of variables used in the analysis are
the military variables:
1. Target Armed Forces (TARMED)
2. Sender Armed Forces (SARMED)
3. Sender is an Arms Producer (SPROD)
4. Target is an Arms Producer (TPROD)
5. Companion Policies (COMPA)
The first two variables were taken from the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency's "World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers." 61 Variables 3 and 4 were listed in Stephanie
Neuman's article entitled "International Stratification and
Third World Military Industries" 62 and in an Institute for
Strategic Studies book, The Military Balance 1979-80 . 63 The
final variable (COMPA) , from Hufbauer and Schott, is also
included under the military as well as the political varia-
bles because it involves the use of either quasi-military
operations, covert action or regular military action to
support economic sanctions.
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B. METHODS OF ANALYSIS
There are four approaches that will be used in the
analysis. They are, in order of presentation, a total
sample analysis, total sample grouped by objectives, pre-
World War II compared to post-World War II sanctions, and
finally a comparison of U.S. instigated sanctions to non-
U.S. instigated sanctions. (See Table 1 for a summary of
the results.) In each case the procedure will be the same.
A factor analysis will be run on the cases selected,
followed by a stepwise discriminant analysis to determine
the variables that are most significant to the pertinent
grouping. The highest loaded variables from the factor
analysis, along with the significant variables from the
stepwise will then be used to perform a discriminant
analysis to determine if the successful sanctions can be
distinguished from the unsuccessful ones.
1. Total Sample Analysis
The total sample consists of all 105 cases listed in
Appendix A. A factor analysis was performed on all the
cases, with the rotated factor pattern producing seven
factor groupings. Target GNP, type of sanction, concentra-
tion of exports, cost per capita, target's armed forces,
sender's population and target import concentration repre-
sent the highest loaded factors from all the variables
inputted. A stepwise discriminant analysis was then con-
ducted, resulting in the most significant variables as
49
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listed in Table 2. The sanctions period, sender GNP, cost
per capita, sender's region, cost to the target, interna-
tional assistance to the target, and the health and stabili-
ty index comprise the significant variables. It must be
pointed out that the stepwise variables only comprise 33
percent of the variation in the success scores from the
total sample as shown under the "average squared canonical
correlation" column. The final step was running a discrimi-
nant analysis using both the high-loaded variables from the
factor analysis and the significant variables from the step-
wise. The significant variables from the stepwise produced
the best result as presented in Table 3 . The discriminant
analysis contained 23 misclassified cases out of the total
sample of 105. There are a number of cases which are
borderline placement while others have a high percentage of
placement in the incorrect category. There is not a clear
reason for the misclassifications from the results.
2 . Total Sample Divided by Objectives
Appendix A lists the total sample but also has that
sample broken down by objectives/goals of the sender coun-
try. The objectives have been previously discussed in Chap-
ter III. The first objective grouping is modest changes in
target country policies, which begins with case 331 (UK vs
USSR, 1933) and ends with case 833 (U.S. vs Zimbabwe, 1983).
A factor analysis produced six variables having the highest
loading: GNP ratio (sender to target), sender's armed
52
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TABLE 3
TOTAL SAMPLE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
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forces, target area, cost to the target, target's armed
forces and the trade linkage. The stepwise discriminant
analysis resulted in three variables as being significant:
companion policies, sender's GNP, and the sender's region,
which account for only 32 percent of the variation in the
success score listed under the canonical correlation column
(Table 4) . Performing a discriminant analysis utilizing the
highest loaded variables from the factor analysis resulted
in 13 cases being misclassif ied. The best results were
achieved when the discriminant analysis was run using the
significant variables from the stepwise. Those results in
Table 5 show only 9 cases as being misclassified out of a
total of 44 cases. The probability of placement of the mis-
classified cases in the incorrect category are, for all but
a few cases, borderline.
The second set of objectives are those cases which
fall under the goal of destabilization of target govern-
ments. This grouping of objectives begins with case 181 (UK
vs Russia, 1918) and ends with case 834 (U.S., OECS vs
Grenada, 1983). The rotated factor pattern indicated that
the target's concentration of exports, target's armed
forces, target government, target region and the cost per
capita are the highest loaded variables. The stepwise dis-
criminant analysis produced three variables which are signi-
ficant to this objective grouping: international assistance
to the target, prior relations index, and the trade linkage
57
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(Table 6) . These three variables provide for 57 percent of
the variation in the success scores in this grouping listed
under the canonical correlation column. A combination of
the results from the factor analysis and the stepwise dis-
criminant analysis produced the best results shown in Table
7. The variables used in the discriminant analysis were:
international assistance to the target, prior relations
index, trade linkage, target population, cost per capita,
and companion policies. There is only one misclassification
of the 17 cases in the grouping. The one misclassification
has a very high probability of placement in the incorrect
category (91.01 percent) for case 441 (U.S. vs Argentina,
1944) .
Disruption of military adventures (other than major
wars) is the third objective grouping to be investigated.
This grouping begins with case 211 (League of Nations vs
Yugoslavia, 1921) and ends with case 821 (UK vs Argentina,
1982) . The rotated factor pattern revealed five factor
groupings with the following variables highly loaded: cost
to the target, concentration of exports, international
assistance to the target, target's armed forces, and the
international cooperation with the sender. The stepwise
discriminant analysis resulted in only two variables deemed
significant (Table 8) : target higher education index and
the target region. Those two variables account for 57 per-
cent of the variation in the success scores indicated under
61
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SECOND OBJECTIVE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
Posterior Probability of Membership in GSANC:
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the canonical correlation column. The combination of the
factor analysis results along with the stepwise results
produced a discriminant analysis with only one case mis-
classified (Table 9) . The variables used included the
higher education index, target region, trade linkage, inter-
national assistance to the target, and the cost as a percen-
tage of GNP. Case 401 (U.S. vs Japan, 1940) had an 87
percent chance of placement in the incorrect category.
The fourth set of objectives are those cases which
fall under the goal of impairment of military potential
(including major wars) . This grouping begins with case 141
(UK vs Germany, 1914) and ends with case 813 (U.S. vs USSR,
1981) . It turned out that a factor analysis was not
required for this grouping, since the stepwise discriminant
analysis produced an average squared canonical correlation
of over 94 percent (Table 10) . The three variables which
account for the large variation in the success scores are:
the cost to the target, type of sanction, and the cost to
the sender. Those variables were then employed in a dis-
criminant analysis which produced a perfect classification
scheme (Table 11) . The description of perfect comes from
the fact that there is a 100 percent probability of correct
classification for all cases.
The fifth and final objective grouping falls under
the goal of other major changes in target country policies
(including surrender of territory) . The grouping begins
65
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THIRD OBJECTIVE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS



















1 1 0.0055 0.9945
1 1 0.3303 0.6697
0.9740 0.0260
0.6768 0.3232
1 * 0.1254 0.8746
1 1 0.0126 0.9874
0.9928 0.0072





































FOURTH OBJECTIVE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
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with case 171 (U.S. vs Japan, 1917) and ends with case 814
(EC vs Turkey, 1981) . As with the previous grouping there
was no need to perform a factor analysis, since the stepwise
discriminant analysis produced a 94 percent canonical corre-
lation (Table 12) . The five variables which reached the 94
percent mark are: cost as a percentage of GNP, cost to the
target, trade linkage, cost per capita, and the type of
sanction. Those five variables were then entered into a
discriminant analysis which resulted in another perfect
classification (Table 13) . The percentage of correct
placement for all cases is 100 percent.
3 . Pre World War II versus Post World War II
In order to test the world environment surrounding
the use of sanctions, the total sample was broken down into
pre and post World War II timeframes. The pre World War II
rotated factor pattern produced four groupings resulting
with the following variables having the highest loading:
the target's armed forces, import concentration, sender's
GNP, and the cost as a percentage of GNP. The stepwise dis-
criminant analysis resulted in two variables being signifi-
cant: import concentration and target region (Table 14) .
Those two variables account for over 66 percent of the
variation in the success scores. A discriminant analysis
was run using those two variables, which resulted in only
one case being misclassified (Table 15) . Case 141 (UK vs
69
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FIFTH OBJECTIVE DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
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PRE-WORLD WAR II DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
Posterior Probability of Membership in GSANC:
FROM CLASSIFIED 1
GSANC INTO GSANC
1 * 0.6417 0.3583
1 1 0.0817 0.9183
0.9906 0.0094
0.9731 0.0269










Germany, 1914) had a 64 percent probability of placement in
the incorrect category.
The post World War II rotated factor pattern
produced seven groupings, with the following variables
having high loadings: the target's urbanization, type of
sanction, cost to the target, cost per capita, target's
armed forces, commodity concentration, and the sender's
population. A stepwise analysis of all variables produced
ten variables which are significant and account for 51
percent of the variation in the success score (Table 16) .
The same ten variables were used in a discriminant analysis
and resulted in 15 misclassif ications (Table 17)
.
4 . U.S. versus Non-U. S. Sanctions
To discover the differences in sanctions that are
initiated by the U.S. compared to non-U. S. initiators, the
total sample was broken down accordingly. The non-U. S.
rotated factor pattern produced seven variables with high
loadings: cost as a percentage of GNP, health and stability
index, cost to the target, target's armed forces, import
concentration, trade linkage, and the sender's population.
A stepwise of all the variables resulted in a canonical
correlation of 31 percent and the resultant discriminant
analysis had 8 cases misclassif ied. Utilizing the highest
loading variables from the factor analysis grouping as the
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POST-WORLD WAR II DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS
Posterior Probability of Membership in GSANC:






























































































































0. 2267 0. 7733
0. 8433 0. 1567
0. 8585 0. 1415
0. 2606 0. 7394
0. 7241 0. 2759
0. 7818 0. 2182
0. 0129 0. 9871
0. 7713 0. 2287
0. 0245 0. 9755
0. 8771 0. 1229
0. 8070 0.,1930

















































































Posterior Probability of Membership in GSANC:
FROM CLASSIFIED 1
GSANC INTO GSANC
1 1 0.4710 0.5290
1 * 0.6063 0.3937
1 1 0.3502 0.6498
1 * 0.3014 0.6986
0.8298 0.1702
0.5361 0.4639








1 1 0.0226 0.9774
0.7189 0.2811
1 * 0.4063 0.5937
1 * 0.4913 0.5087
1 1 0.4351 0.5649
1 & 0.2695 0.7305
1 1 0.2331 0.7669
1 * 0.4332 0.5668
1 1 0.3276 0.6724
0.8940 0.1060
0.5849 0.4151
1 * 0.7532 0.2468











The rotated factor pattern of the U.S. inspired
sanctions also resulted in seven variables with high
loadings: concentration of exports, cost to the target, GNP
ratio of sender to target, target's armed forces, sanctions
period, target area, and the sender's armed forces. A step-
wise analysis produced six variables which account for 40
percent of the variation in the success scores: sender's
armed forces, cost to sender, cost to the target, sender's
GNP, sanctions period, and the cost per capita (Table 19) .
Those six variables were used in the discriminant analysis,
which produced 14 misclassified cases (Table 20)
.
C . SUMMARY
The initial discussion described the definition of
success used in this analysis. Hufbauer and Schott have
provided the following formula for computing the success of
a sanction episode: Multiply the policy result score by the
sanctions contribution score. The combination of the policy
result and sanction contribution scores will result in a
numerical figure which is between and 16. This analysis
evaluated all the sanctions that received a success score of
9 and above as successful and conversely those with scores
of 8 and below as unsuccessful.
The next section discussed the variables used in the
analysis. They were grouped into political, economic, geo-
grpahic and military categories. Hufbauer and Schott
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0. 2016 0. 7984
0. 5159 0. 4841
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provie core of variables which was then expanded to
over'iables.
;ual empirical results were then presented in four
diffgroupings. The first group was a total sample
analif all 105 cases in the database. The best
discit analysis resulted in 23 misclassif ied cases.
The grouping was by the goals/objectives of the
sendntry. There was a mixed result in the various
objejroupings. Two groupings had only one misclassi-
fiedin each while two other groupings were able to be
accu classified with 100 percent probability of place-
ments largest objective grouping resulted in 9
misclcations.
'ird grouping was by pre- and post-World War II
time. The pre-World War II grouping could accurately
predl but one case. The post-World War II grouping
resui 15 misclassifications at best. The final group-
ing ) distinguish between U.S . -initiated versus non-
U.S.-ited sanction episodes. The non-U. S. cases
prodi misclassifications while the U.S. -initiated cases
prod\3 misclassifications from an admittedly larger
groupses.
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V. EVALUATION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This chapter follows the same organization as the pre-
ceding chapter. The total sample will be evaluated,
followed by the total sample broken down by objectives/goals
of the sender country. Pre-World War II sanctions will then
be compared to post-World War II sanctions, as will U.S. to
non-U. S. sanctions. The final evaluation will discuss the
differences in all the groupings as well as similarities
discovered by the empirical results.
A. TOTAL SAMPLE
The most statistically significant indicator of the suc-
cess of a sanction episode is the period of time that par-
ticular sanction is in force (PERIO) . That may seem to be a
revelation contrary to accepted theory, but it must be kept
in mind that the period of time only accounts for about 6
percent of the reason for success. Two characteristics of
the sender play an important role in the success of a sanc-
tion. The sender must be able to afford to institute a
sanction (SGNP) and a portion of the sender's credibility
can be said to be measured by the location of the sender
(SREGN) . Incidentally, all the senders were producers of
military goods, since SPROD was constant throughout this
sample. In addition to the sender's being able to afford
the sanction, the target must keep his cost per capita down
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by using other sources to circumvent the sanction (COCAP,
INTAS) . Though the overall cost to the target should not be
prohibitive, if the target is a stable country it should be
able to sidestep the sanction (COSTG, HEALT)
.
The total number of variables used in the analysis pro-
duced only 41 percent of the variation in the success score,
while the significant variables made up 33 percent of the
variation. There is still a high percentage of the success
unexplained, but some of the variables which have been
deemed significant in the literature have turned out not to
have a major impact. Companion policies is one such varia-
ble, which shows that the role of force (covert, quasi or
regular military) is not a significant contributor to the
success of sanction episodes overall. The bottom line
evaluation of the ability to predict the success of a sanc-
tion is hazardous at best. There is not a single formula
for evaluating its effectiveness, since over 22 percent of
the cases, based on the most significant variables known,
were misclassified as being either successful or
unsuccessful
.
B. TOTAL SAMPLE BY OBJECTIVES
This grouping has the best percentage of predicting the
success of a sanction episode. With the exception of
obtaining modest changes to the target country policies, the
other sets of cases have a high degree of predictability.
In two sets there were only one misclassification each,
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while in the last two the success or failure of the episode
was classified exactly. Therefore it must be concluded that
the type of objective has a significant impact on the suc-
cessful classification and implementation of a sanction
episode.
The first objective grouping, "modest changes in the
target country policies," 64 had three variables that were
significant. Companion policies (the use of force) was the
most significant indicator. Actually, it is the lack of the
use of force that is most striking about this grouping.
When covert force or guasi or military operations are used,
the success of the sanction episode is diminished. The
sender must again be able to afford to pay for the modest
changes and his credibility must be good to follow through
on his threats in order to succeed (SGNP, SREGN) . Seventy
percent of the variation in the success score is unaccounted
for in this grouping, since the significant indicators only
represent 32 percent of the variation.
The second objective grouping, "destabilization of tar-
get governments," 65 also had only three variables that
contributed to the success score. If the target government
can get help from another source it can circumvent the sanc-
tion since it is usually in a bad position with respect to
the amount of trade it conducts with the sender and appears
to have been conducting that trade for guite some time
(INTAS, PRIOR, TRADE). The variables above account for 57
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percent of the variation in the success score, which leaves
over 4 percent that is unaccounted for. Despite the small
contribution the variables make towards the variation in the
success score, only one case was misclassified.
The third objective grouping, "disruption of military
adventures (other than major wars)," 66 had five variables
which account for 57 percent of the variation in the suc-
cess score. The target appears to be the main concern in
this grouping. The area where the target is located, in
addition to keeping the cost relative to its GNP down, is
important (COGNP, TREGN) . For the first time the education-
al level of the target country comes into play (HEDUC) . As
with the last grouping the amount of assistance the target
can get from other countries can help it to sidestep the
sanction despite the high level of trade it has already
accrued with the sender country (INTAS, TRADE). Again, over
40 percent of the reasons for success are unknown but only
one case was misclassified.
The fourth and fifth objective groupings, "impairment of
military potential (including major wars) and other major
changes in target country policies (including surrender of
territory)," 67 had variables which accounted for 94 percent
of the variation in the success scores. The fourth grouping
concentrated on the costs the target had to bear (COGNP,
COSTG and COCAP) . Trade linkage played an important part in
the determination of success (TRADE) . For the first time,
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the type of sanction employed was statistically significant
to the classification procedure (TYPE) . The fifth objective
grouping was first concerned with the cost the target had to
worry about, but also with the relative cost to the sender
(COSTG, COSEN) . In this grouping the type of sanction
employed by the sender played an important part in achieving
classification. The two groups together have the cost to
the target and the type of sanction in common to their
successful classification. The sample sizes are small for
these last two groupings, therefore caution must be exer-
cised in reporting these results as having universal
applicability.
C. PRE VERSUS POST WORLD WAR II SANCTIONS
This grouping was set up to test Richard Elling's asser-
tion that the global environment has influenced the outcome
and initiation of sanctions as a policy instrument. The
pre-World war II sample contained two variables that were
significant to the classification procedure. To achieve 66
percent of the variation in the success score only the
import concentration of the target and its region had to be
known (IMCOM, TREGN) . This could imply that the existing
external power balance in the world at the time was of a
much simpler makeup. The two variables still resulted in
only one misclassification of the sample cases.
The post-World War II grouping produced 10 variables
which only account for 51 percent of the variation in the
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success scores. Those ten variables then resulted in 15
cases being classified incorrectly. Again, the assertion
that the balance of power has become more complex and com-
plicated could be an important influence, yet there is no
way to guantify that assertion. It appears that to initiate
a sanction in the post-World War II timeframe reguires a
much more complex understanding of the various processes
that are at work within the international system.
D. U.S. VERSUS NON-U. S. INSTIGATED SANCTIONS
The seven variables that resulted in 31 percent of the
variation in the success scores of the non-U. S. group only
have one variable in common with the U.S. inspired group:
cost to the target (COSTG) . In the non-U. S. group the
target is concerned with the cost as a whole and with the
cost as a percentage of GNP (COSTG, COGNP) . The size of the
target's armed forces play a role in determining whether a
sanction will be successful or not, which may have something
to do with the sender's calculations of the strength of the
target's military response, prior to instituting a sanction
(TARMED) . The target is also concerned with the amount of
trade it has with the sender, as well as the concentration
of its imports (TRADE, IMCOM) . The stability of the target
is also an influence on the success of a sanction instigated
by a non-U. S. country (HEALT) . Finally, the sender's
population is statistically significant to the process of
coercion (SPOP) . Though there are a number of factors which
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contribute to a successful sanction this grouping still
managed to have 7 cases misclassified.
The U. S . -inspired sanctions fared no better than the
non-U. S., with the six variables deemed significant result-
ing in 14 misclassified cases. The six variables only
comprise 40 percent of the variation in the success score.
When the U.S. institutes a sanction the size of its armed
forces must stand for the credibility behind the sanction
(SARMED) . Both the cost to the sender and the cost to the
target play a role in a successful U.S. sanction (COSEN,
COSTG) . The target is further concerned with a relative
measure of the cost to its economy in terms of per capita
(COCAP) . The U.S. uses the size of its GNP to exert demands
and uses that GNP to shape the period of time the sanction
is in force (SGNP, PERIO) . Even with those observations
there are still 60 percent of the reasons for a successful
U.S. sanction unknown! The major difference between the
U.S. and non-U. S. inspired sanctions is the frequency by
which sender countries use them. The sample of the non-U. S.
sanctions is considerably smaller than the U.S. sample.
This analysis cannot answer why the U.S. uses sanctions,
only what variables must be looked at prior to the decision
of implementing a sanction.
It is sometimes beneficial to look at some of the
variables which are not contributors to a successful U.S.
sanction. International cooperation with the sender does
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not add to a sanction episode. It appears that conventional
wisdom is incorrect when there are so many calls for ally-
support before instituting a sanction. It is more important
to ensure that the target does not receive the needed
support to circumvent the sanction than it is to have a
large number of allies applying the sanction with the
sender. The wisdom of using force, whether in the form of
covert, quasi-military or regular military, is not a signi-
ficant indicator of the success of an episode. Therefore it
would be safe to say that using military force in
conjunction with economic sanctions is a waste of badly
needed resources. Surprisingly, the type of sanction used
is not statistically significant to the outcome. Whether
the U.S. refuses to buy the target's exports, aims at the
imports from the target, or cuts off financial flows such as
freezing assets, the success of the sanction episode depends
on other factors. James Lindsay may be correct that inter-
national and domestic symbolism are the most important goals
of a U.S. inspired sanction and the other goals may only be
ancillary. 68 Policymakers may expect the sanction to fail
in forcing the target into compliance, but their ultimate
aim is to state the U.S. position on an international issue
by using the forum of sanctions. Since the cost to the
sender is an important variable and the nature of U.S.
policy decisions is public, there must be accountability for
using sanctions to achieve foreign policy goals.
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E. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN GROUPINGS
There are almost as many similarities as there are dif-
ferences among the groupings of sanction episodes. The com-
plexity of the number of different sets of factors which
affect the successful classification of a sanction episode
is overwhelming, as is the amount of variation in the
success of a sanction that is not included within the varia-
bles chosen. An attempt will be made to determine some
common bonds from the empirical results as well as inconsis-
tencies between the groupings.
1. Similarities
The most pervasive variable which crops up in some
form or another is the cost to the target. Whether stated
as a percentage of GNP or per capita, the cost to the target
is a significant indicator of differentiating between a suc-
cessful sanction and an unsuccessful one in a majority of
the groupings. Johan Galtung's vulnerability is also signi-
ficant to the differentiation process. Vulnerability takes
the form of the trade linkage existing between the sender
and the target prior to the implementation of sanctions. It
also takes the form of the measure of the concentration of
imports which can admittedly be affected by a sanction epi-
sode directed toward those imports. The sanction can have a
devastating effect if the sender is the sole supplier of the
imported good and if the sender can prevent allies of the
target from rendering assistance in the form of the good or
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goods sanctioned. The assistance of an ally was a more
significant indicator of the success of a sanction episode
in the pre-World War II timeframe than it is today.
Economic variables are present in every grouping
presented with at least one variable being significant to
the classification procedure. The same can be said of
political variables in all groupings except those conducted
prior to World War II. Geographic and military variables
are less common indicators of the success of the sanction.
The exception again is that a geographic variable plays an
important part in the differentiation process in pre-World
War II cases. Military variables such as companion policies
(use of force) , target and sender armed forces are not per-
sistent indicators of success.
2 . Differences
Companion policies only play a part in the classifi-
cation scheme when the sanctions are divided by objectives.
The specific objective of "modest changes in target country
policies" is the only grouping which contains the use of
force. It actually has a negative connotation since the
success depends on not using covert, quasi or regular mili-
tary force to obtain success. As a whole, sanctions do not
depend on the use of force to achieve success. It is possi-
ble that they depend on the target's perception of the
willingness of the sender to actually use force that may
really influence success. The size of the target and sender
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armed forces oecoraes significant when the grouping is
divided into land non-U. S. sanctions. This may mean
that the U.S. Is on the size of its forces to threaten
the target intcission while the target uses the size of
its forces to cract the implied threat of using force.
The tyjsanction initiated has utility only when
aiming for tbjectives of "impairment of military
potential or r major changes in target country
policies." 'The of sanction imposed has no bearing on a
sanction episocrall and is not a significant contribu-
tor to successny sanction imposed since World War II.
The role of tability of a target nation has split
results. It iortant when a non-U. S. country is the
sender and in post-World War II cases. It is also
significant in :otal sample overall. Stability has no
part in the cl.cation procedure when the episodes are
broken down accj to the goals of the sender country.
There snumber of variables that are important
in only one gig yet have no bearing on the total
sampling. Thian indication of the complexity of each
and every sanctpisode and the fact that all the forces
at work in deteig success are not understood.
F . SUMMARY
The total £ analysis revealed that only 33 percent
of the variat in a sanction episode overall are
accounted for the most statistically significant
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variables. A regression analysis of all the variables
raised that to only 41 percent. The sanctions period was
the most significant indicator for the classification proce-
dure. All senders in the total sample were producers of
military hardware. The senders should be aware of the role
of their GNP. The sender's region is postulated to repre-
sent the credibility behind the sanction. On the other
hand, the target must watch the cost of the sanction in
terms of* per capita effect. The target can sidestep the
sanction's effect by finding another country to supply or
buy the sanctioned good. The role, of force (covert, quasi
or regular military) is not a significant indicator of a
successful sanction overall.
When the total sample was divided by the goals of the
sender country, different results appeared. The ability to
classify successful and unsuccessful sanctions was made
slightly easier in two objective groupings (one misclassifi-
cation each) . Two other objective groupings produced a good
classification scheme, with all cases being correctly
classified. The largest objective grouping produced only 32
percent of the variation in the success score and resulted
in 9 cases being misclassif ied. That objective, "modest
changes in target country policies," was the only grouping
in which companion policies were statistically significant.
It was shown that force, measured by companion policies, had
a negative impact on the success of a sanction in this
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grouping. Seventy percent of the variance in the success
scores for this grouping was not included in the variables
used in the analysis.
The second objective grouping, "destabilization of tar-
get governments," had 40 percent of the variation in the
success scores unaccounted for. The target is the main
focus of the variables that are significant. The target has
had good relations with the sender prior to the sanction and
conducts a good deal of trade with the sender. To sidestep
those variables the target must secure assistance from
another country. The third objective grouping, "disruption
of military adventures (other than major wars)," also left
out 40 percent of the variation in the success scores. The
target should be concerned with the cost, region and the
amount of trade with the sender. To counteract the trade
variable the target should seek assistance from another
source for the sanctioned good. The fourth grouping,
"impairment of military potential," focused almost exclu-
sively on the target. The type of sanction was significant
to success for the first time in the analysis. The various
cost and trade indicators, together with the type of sanc-
tion, comprise 94 percent of the success score. The final
objective grouping, "other major changes in target country
policies," added the cost to the sender as an important
indicator of success. The cost to the sender, along with
the
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cost to the target, comprised 94 percent of the variation in
the success score.
Pre- and post-World War II cases were then surveyed.
The cases prior to World War II had only two variables that
were significant and led to the conclusion that Richard
Ellings may have been correct in his assertion that the
balance of power had changed over time and affected the
institution of sanctions. Post World War II sanctions
produced ten variables which accounted for less variance
than the two variables of the pre-war era, lending further
credence to Ellings 1 claim. U.S. and non-U. S. instigated
sanctions were compared. The non-U. S. sanctions were mainly
concerned with the target, while the U.S. sanctions included
a few sender variables. It was asserted that James Lindsay
may have been correct in his opinion that the U.S. insti-
tutes sanctions for the international and domestic symbolism
involved.
The final section dealt with the similarities and dif-
ferences in sanction groupings. The various costs to the
target were present in different forms in almost all the
groupings. Vulnerability in the form of trade with the
sender and import concentration was an important factor in
the classification procedure. Companion policies were shown
to only affect one objective in a negative way and to not be
a significant factor in the success of sanctions. Armed
forces of either the sender or the target was not
98
significant to the analysis except in the U.S. and non-U. S.
grouping. The final evaluation of the results indicates
that a large percentage of the reasons for success are still
unknown; therefore, except in the case of two small sample
groups, sanctions cannot be accurately predicted. They have
become extremely complex in the world today.
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VI. IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST?
This chapter will put aside the empirical results and
categorize U.S. unilateral and multilateral sanctions into
the various types of interests previously identified by
Donald Neuchterlein. Those interests are defense, economic,
world order and ideological. 69 The issues involved in each
sanction case will be generalized and evaluated as to
whether they are of survival, vital, major or peripheral
intensity. 70 Finally Neuchterlein' s matrix will be present-
ed visualizing the position of sanctions with respect to the
U.S. national interest.
A. BASIC NATIONAL INTEREST
The issues involved in the U.S. sanction episodes must
first be categorized into Neuchterlein s basic national
interests (defense, economic, world order and ideological)
.
The issues related to sanctions are listed in Appendix B.
The multitude of sanction cases can be subjectively simpli-
fied into six different groups: human rights, nuclear safe-
guards, expropriation, destabilization, territorial and war.
Now the task is to assign the various issue groups into one
of the basic national interests.
1. Human rights: This issue is most easily identified as
an ideological interest. The U.S. believes that its
set of values expressed in the form of human rights
are universally good and therefore should be followed
by all nations.
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2. Nuclear safeguards: The protection of the interna-
tional system relies on the protection of nuclear
weapons and their proliferation. This issue fits into
the world order interest category.
3. Expropriation: This issue is most easily identified
with the economic interest category. Most of the
expropriation cases involve the seizure of U.S. com-
pany assets and not U.S. government properties.
4. Destabilization: This issue is mainly involved with
the protection of world order interests. Sometimes
the ideological label could be applied to destabiliz-
ing a government.
5. Territorial: This issue also is covered by the world
order interest category. Occasionally the seizure of
territory can be influenced by economic reasons, but
on the whole, world order interests is a more accurate
label
.
6. War: This issue is most certainly of the defense
interest category. Only during this issue can physi-
cal violence be used towards the homeland of the coun-
try initiating the sanction.
B. INTENSITY OF INTEREST
The next step in the process is to subjectively evaluate
the basic national interests (issues) as to where they fit
in the hierarchy of perceived intensities. The categories
of intensities are survival, vital, major and peripheral as
discussed in Chapter II.
1. Economic Interests (expropriation): The states well-
being is not affected by the act of expropriation.
Companies and private citizens suffer only. Therefore
this must be classified as a peripheral interest.
2. World Order Interests (nuclear safeguards, destabili-
zation and territorial): The states political,
economic and ideological well-being could be adversely
affected by this category. In some instances the
nuclear safeguard issue could be raised to the vital
category depending on the states involved. Thus must
be classified as a major interest.
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3. Ideological Interests (human rights): This certainly
does not affect the sender state in any respect. It
only affects citizens of other states. This must be
classified as a peripheral interest.
4. Defense Interests (war): This is the only category
where the homeland of the state involved could be
threatened. There are only a few of the cases where
the U.S. used sanctions that can fall into this cate-
gory. This must be classified into the survival issue
category when a war that can threaten the homeland is
being waged, otherwise the majority of cases fall into
the peripheral category.
C. MATRIX OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Neuchterlein' s matrix, depicting the national interest,
will be presented to show where sanction issues stand (Table
21). In order to be in the national interest of the U.S.,
economic sanctions should have at least two basic interests
in the vital category or at least one basic interest in the
TABLE 21
MATRIX OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Country: U.S. Issue: Economic Sanctions
Basic interest at stake Intensity of interest
Survival Vital Major Peripheral
Defense of homeland X*
Economic well-being X
Favorable world order X
Ideological X
*Cases 171, 441 and 391 would be classified as survival
issues; the majority of the cases under the war cate-
gory did not threaten the homeland of the U.S.
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survival category. 71 From the table above, sanctions do not
generally fulfill the requirement for two vital interests.
In the cases where the defense of the homeland is a survival
issue (war) then sanctions fulfill the requirement and can be
said to be in the national interest.
This has been a generalization of U.S. instigated sanc-
tions. It must be remembered that issues which have been
described above as being only in the realm of world order
interests actually can have spillover into other categories
as well. For this analysis the major category that the
issue affects has been chosen for illustration. Addition-
ally, intensities of interests change with time. An analy-
sis of oil expropriation at the time it was happening would
most likely result in a different intensity being assigned.
Intensities of interest are also different for the parties
involved. The sender of a sanction may view expropriation
as a peripheral issue yet the country being targeted may
view it as an issue that means its survival.
D. SUMMARY
The empirical results have been set aside and a differ-
ent approach has been tried to assess the impact economic
sanctions have on the U.S. national interest. Donald Neuch-
terlein's basic interests have been identified within the
context of sanction issues. The basic interests include
defense, economic, world order and ideological.
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Sanction issues have been broken down into six categor-
ies: human rights, nuclear safeguards, expropriation,
destabilization, territorial and war. Each issue has been
assigned to the main basic interest that it affects. Human
rights has been classified as an ideological interest.
Expropriation has been classified as an economic interest.
Nuclear safeguards, destabilization and territorial issues
have been classified as world order interests. The final
issue, war, has been classified as a defense interest.
Each basic interest was then evaluated on its intensity.
The economic interests were deemed to be of a peripheral
intensity. The ideological interests also fit into the
peripheral category. World order interests were suggested
to be of a major intensity. Defense interests could be
classified as both of a survival or peripheral nature. The
small number of cases where the homeland of the U.S. was
actually threatened precluded assigning the survival label
across the defense board.
It was determined that in order for any issue to be in
the national interest there had to be at least two vital
issues or at least one survival issue involved. Economic
sanctions do not meet that requirement.
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VII. CONCLUSION
A. EVALUATION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Economic sanctions have been successful in about 35
percent of the cases examined. To be successful they must
score well in two areas: policy result and sanctions con-
tribution to that policy result. The empirical data has
shown that when all the cases are broken down by the goals
of the sender, there is a good chance of predicting a suc-
cessful sanction in only two of the five objective group-
ings. Two other groupings had one misclassified case each,
while the largest objective grouping could do no better than
result in 9 misclassified cases. This is the best result.
The total sample analysis showed that there were 2 3 cases
misclassif ied out of a total of 105. Only 41 percent of the
variation in the success score could be accounted for by all
34 variables used in the analysis. That means that 60
percent of the forces that affect the processes of imposing
a successful sanction are not discussed in the literature.
A difference did appear in the sample when it was divided
into pre- and post-World War II cases. There were only two
variables which contributed to the differences between a
successful and unsuccessful sanction in the pre-war sample.
The post-war sample resulted in ten variables which were
significant to the differences but produced less of an
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accounting of the variation in the success scores overall.
This appears to confirm, at least not contradict, Ellings'
contention that the structural changes in the global context
have influenced the success of sanctions. Sanctions imposed
prior to World War II were of a simple nature, whereas later
ones tended to be complex. The U.S. and non-U. S. split
produced 7 and 14 misclassifications respectively. The
common variable to the two groups was the cost to the tar-
get. The non-U. S. group focused on the target while the
U.S. group focused on the sender. There were not many
common themes in all the groupings (total sample, objective
grouping, pre- and post-World War II, and U.S. and non-U. S.)
other than the cost to the target expressed in many differ-
ent forms.
Sanctions cases, in the light of the issues surrounding
their imposition, were viewed as less than critical to the
survival of the U.S. The basic national interests of the
U.S. (defense, world order, economic and ideological) were
shown to be on the peripheral in most sanction cases. Only
the defense interest was evaluated to be of survival inten-
sity in the cases involving the world wars. All other cases
fell into the peripheral category. World order interests
resulting from destabilization cases, nuclear safeguard
cases and territorial cases were seen to be of a major
concern to the U.S. but not vital. Economic interests were
limited to private individuals and corporations, but not to
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the U.S. as a whole. They were evaluated as also being
peripheral to the survival of the U.S. Ideological inter-
ests, exemplified by the human rights cases, were also
deemed to be peripheral to the survival of the U.S.
For economic sanctions to be in the national interest
they must meet two criteria. First, the issue for which a
sanction has been imposed must be evaluated as being of
vital or survival intensity in at least two of the four
basic national interest categories outlined in Nuechter-
lein's matrix. It has been shown that sanctions have not
met the first criteria except in the cases involving the
world wars. Generally, sanctions have been instituted to
resolve issues that have been on the periphery of United
States' basic national interests. Second, sanctions should
be able to be predicted with a high degree of certainty that
the sanction will be successful. A high degree of certainty
is a subjective measure which lies between the best case of
100 percent predictability exhibited by two of the five
objective groupings and the worst case of 75 percent predic-
tability exhibited by the non-U. S. grouping. Realizing the
shortfalls of social science predictive capacities a predic-
tion percentage goal will be subjectively set at 90 percent.
Using that figure as a standard, the predictions have fallen
short of the mark. Therefore the second criteria also has
not been met. Whether viewed from the perspective of the
empirical data or from the perspective of issues surrounding
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their imposition, economic sanctions appear to not be in the
national interest of the United States. Therefore the
hypothesis must be rejected.
B. IMPLICATIONS
The United States continues to use sanctions as one of
its main methods of signaling displeasure with a foreign
policy issue. James Lindsay may be right in asserting that
they are best used for international and domestic symbolism.
The symbolic effect should be the primary objective in a
sanction episode until the two previously listed criteria
can be met. If policymakers are willing to pay the costs
that a sender country must pay and are aware that only about
one-third of the sanctions are successful in achieving goals
other than symbolism, then sanctions can be utilized. Until
more reasons for the success of sanctions are understood
then they should be used only as symbolic measures and not
as a panacea for all foreign policy problems. Other types
of sanctions such as diplomatic and communication sanctions
could also be used. 73 By using economic sanctions the trade
variable, which may be a tool for influence, is automatical-
ly eliminated from any future influence operation. The use
of military force in conjunction with economic sanctions has
been shown to be not statistically significant to the out-
come of an episode. The resources of the military are best
used in its primary mission, not as an accompanying policy
to a sanction.
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One last variable, which is most difficult to quantify,
is the credibility of the sender country. That, along with
capability, certainly are the two main factors in any influ-
ence operation. Credibility of the sender is lost when the
target can get a substitute good from a competitor or when
the sender is trying to achieve a goal other than publicity.
Policymakers must take all these factors into account before
announcing that economic sanctions will be imposed, unless
failure is their objective from the start.
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APPENDIX A
SANCTION CASES BY OBJECTIVES
Objective: Modest Changes in Target Country Policies
Case Sender and Target
331 UK v. USSR
381 US, UK v. Mexico
541 USSR v. Australia
562 US, UK, France v. Egypt
611 US v. Ceylon
623 USSR v. Romania
631 US v. UAR
641 France v. Tunisia
651 US v. Chile
652 US v. India
681 US v. Peru
682 US v. Peru
732 US v. South Korea
73 3 US v. Chile
742 Canada v. India
743 Canada v. Pakistan
751 US, Canada v. South Korea
752 US v. USSR
753 US v. Eastern Europe
754 US v. South Africa
761 US v. Uruguay
762 US v. Taiwan
763 US v. Ethiopia
771 US v. Paraguay
772 US v. Guatemala
773 US v. Argentina
774 Canada v. EC, Japan
776 US v. El Salvador
777 US v. Brazil
781 China v. Albania
782 US v. Brazil
783 US v. Argentina
784 US v. India
785 US v. USSR
791 US v. Iran
792 US v. Pakistan
79 3 Arab League v. Canada
794 US v. Bolivia
802 US v. Iraq
822 Netherlands, US v. Suriname
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823 South Africa v. Lesotho
831 Australia v. France
832 US v. USSR
83 3 US v. Zimbabwe
Objective: Destabilization of Target Governments
Case Sender and Target
181 UK v. Russia
441 US v. Argentina
484 USSR v. Yugoslavia
511 UK, US v. Iran
564 US v. Laos
581 USSR v. Finland
601 US v. Dominican Republic
603 US v. Cuba
612 USSR v. Albania
621 US v. Brazil
633 US v. Indonesia
634 US v. South Vietnam
653 UK, UN v. Rhodesia
701 US v. Chile
721 UK, US v. Uganda
775 US v. Nicaragua
788 US v. Libya
811 US v. Nicaragua
834 US, OECS v. Grenada
Objective: Disruption of Military Adventures
(Other Than Major Wars)
Case Sender and Target
211 League v. Yugoslavia
251 League v. Greece
321 League v. Paraguay, Bolivia
351 League v. Italy
401 US v. Japan
481 US v. Netherlands
491 US, CHINCOM v. Chile
563 US v. UK, France
572 France v. Tunisia
603 US v. Cuba
631 US v. UAR
633 US v. Indonesia
711 US v. India, Pakistan
741 US v. Turkey
7 55 US v. Kampuchea
787 China v. Vietnam
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801 US v. USSR (Afghanistan)
821 UK v. Argentina
Objective: Impairment of Military Potential
(Including Major Wars)














Alliance Powers v. Germany, Japan
Arab League v. Israel
US, COCOM V. USSR, COMECON
US, CHINCOM v. China
US, UN v. North Korea
US, South Vietnam v. North Vietnam
USSR v. China
US v. USSR (Afghanistan)
US v. USSR (Poland)
Other Major Changes in Target Country Policies
(Including Surrender of Territory)
Sender and Target
171 US v. Japan
482 India v. Hyderabad
483 USSR v. US, UK, France
542 India v. Portugal
543 Spain v. UK
561 US v. Israel (intermittent episodes)
571 Indonesia v. Netherlands
613 Western Allies v. GDR
622 UN v. South Africa
632 Indonesia v. Malaysia
63 5 UN, OAU v. Portugal
654 US v. Arab League
671 Nigeria v. Biafra
731 Arab League v. US, Netherlands
78 6 Arab League v. Egypt
812 US v. Poland
814 EC v. Turkey
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APPENDIX B
U.S. INSTIGATED SANCTION EPISODES
Case Sender and Target
381 U.S. /UK v. Mexico
401 U.S. V. Japan
441 U.S. V. Argentina
171 U.S. V. Japan
562 U.S. /UK/France v. Egypt
611 U.S. v. Ceylon
631 'U.S. v. UAR
651 U.S. v. Chile
652 U.S. v. India
681 U.S. v. Peru
682 U.S. v. Peru
732 U.S. v. South Korea
733 U.S. v. Chile
751 U.S. /Canada v. S. Korea
752 U.S. v. USSR
753 U.S. v. Eastern Europe
754 U.S. v. South Africa
761 U.S. v. Uruguay
762 U.S. v. Taiwan
763 U.S. v. Ethiopia
771 U.S. v. Paraguay
772 U.S. v. Guatemala
773 U.S. v. Argentina
776 U.S. v. El Salvador
111 U.S. v. Brazil
782 U.S. v. Brazil
783 U.S. v. Argentina
784 U.S. v. India
785 U.S. v. USSR
791 U.S. v. Iran
792 U.S. v. Pakistan
794 U.S. v. Bolivia
802 U.S. V. Iraq
822 U.S. /Neth v. Suriname
832 U.S. v. USSR
833 U.S. v. Zimbabwe
481 U.S. v. Netherlands
491 U.S. /CHINCOM v. China
563 U.S. v. UK/France
604 U.S. v. Cuba
711 U.S. v. India/Pakistan
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